

The safety concept for the Dessel surface repository

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Overview







The disposal concept

The site at a glance








Disposal packages (monoliths)

Storage (Belgoprocess)

Installation for the production of monoliths (IPM)


The state of the s RUL MONOLITH **Caisson factory**




Control room (entrance cluster) Operations are remote-controlled and semi-automatic


Full capacity: ~ 1000 monoliths per year

Zoning during waste emplacement







Disposal modules in operation



Filled modules



Timeframes







Safety objective, principles and safety functions

Safety objective and principles

Protecting humans and the environment

now and in the future, without imposing undue burdens on future generations

✓ operational

✓ long term: passive safety

• from harmful effects of ionizing radiation

 \checkmark radiation protection principles

Imiting the activity content of long-lived radionuclides

✓ isolate and contain

by preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, limiting its consequences

 \checkmark defence in depth

Safety functions


- Safety is ensured by a combination of systems, structures and components (SSCs)
- SSC properties allow for safety in both 'normal' conditions and in case of incidents/accidents -> safety functions

Operational period	Post-closure period			
Containment	Containment			
Isolation	Isolation			
Shielding				
Protection	Protection			



Operational safety concept

Timeframes




Operational Period			Post-closure period				
Ia	Ib	II	III	IV	Va	Vb	VI



Containment

- Normal operating conditions:
 - containment of radionuclides inside monolith
 - no contamination
- Other SSCs help ensure containment in case of accidents

Containment



Limiting external irradiation

- Operational radiation protection
- Shielding by SSCs surrounding the waste
- Isolation by means of
 - barriers creating distance
 - collective measures
 - remote-controlled operations
 - fencing (controlled zone, disposal site)
 - individual measures
 - access controls (controlled zone, disposal site)
 - work permits

Shielding practices

- Shielding by mortar and caisson → contact dose rate limited to 20 mSv/h
- To the extent possible: further shielding of monoliths




Transport container on trolley provides shielding

Self-shielding through specific filling sequence


- Limited dose rate per layer of monoliths
- Additional restrictions on topmost layer
- More strongly radiating monoliths in the centre

Isolation (w.r.t. intrusion)




Phase Ia

Access control Fencing around the site




Phase Ib

Access control Fencing around the site



Phase II

Access control Fencing around the site



Protection

Against threats/perturbations

- to strengthen the fulfilment of operational safety functions
 - fire detection/fighting
 - SFP-crane
 - emergency supply
- to ensure that long-term safety functions can be met
 - cover
 - foundations




Long-term safety concept




Safety concept timeframes





Containment


Graded approach ~ residual hazard






Earth cover


Protection of concrete SSCs for ~ 1000 years






Phases III and IV - Preventing radionuclide release





Containment > ~1000 years


Phases Va/b - Limited water infiltration towards the waste (R2a)



- Water infiltration into the modules can no longer be prevented
 - restricted only through evapotranspiration on earth cover remnants
- Preferential flow in inter-monolith spaces


Anti-bathtub system

sand-cement to ensure further drainage



Containment > ~1000 years

Phases Va/b – Containment inside monolith




Releases from monoliths further continue to be limited and spread by

- Slow release from the waste (R1)
 - Sorption on cement
 - Waste characteristics
- Sorption in backfill mortar and caisson (R3)
- Slow diffusion in caisson (R4a)



Containment > ~1000 years

Phases Va/b – Spreading and retardation outside monolith




Fractures as preferential transport routes → **bypass**

Conductive sorbing media spread the release of radionuclides from the system

- Spreading by dispersion in conductive material (R4b)
- Sorption in conductive material (R3)

Isolation

Prevent direct contact between man and waste




- disposal system configuration ensures isolation in absence of direct threats (e.g. intrusion)
- \rightarrow no direct contact
- Surface disposal → possibility of inadvertent intrusion → safety function I1
 - t < 350 years (end of phase III): access restrictions
 - Phases III/IV: barriers around the waste render intrusion difficult and limit its consequences
 - Earth cover & side embankment
 - Concrete SSC's
 - Monoliths






Defence in depth


Level 1 : Prevention




Level 2 : Component



Level 3: Disposal system



Level 4/5: "operational" measures



Humans and the environment are protected, now and in the future, by

- restricting the amount of long-lived radionuclides in the waste;
- radiation protection management;
- isolating the waste from the biosphere and contain the radionuclides;
- subsequent and independent elements of protection (defence in depth).